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Abstract: 
It has been documented that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly to increases in wholesale 
price than to decreases. However, there is very little theoretical or empirical evidence identifying the 
market characteristics responsible for this behavior. This paper presents a new theoretical model of 
asymmetric adjustment that empirically matches observed retail gasoline price behavior better than 
previously suggested explanations. I develop a “reference price” consumer search model that 
assumes consumers’ expectations of prices are based on prices observed during previous 
purchases. The model predicts that consumers search less when prices are falling. This reduced 
search results in higher profit margins and therefore causes a slower price response to cost 
decreases than to cost increases. I then develop testable implications that distinguish my model 
from two alternative explanations of asymmetric adjustment. The first is a model in which firms 
temporarily collude using past prices as a focal price. The second theory suggests that increases in 
wholesale cost volatility reduce consumer search behavior. Using a panel of gas station prices, I 
estimate the response pattern of prices to a change in costs. Estimates are consistent with the 
predictions of the reference price search model and contradict the previously suggested 
explanations of asymmetric price adjustment. 
 
__________________________ 
I would like to thank my advisor Severin Borenstein, as well as Richard Gilbert, Stephen Holland, 
Aviv Nevo, Carl Shapiro, Celeste Saravia, Catherine Wolfram and everyone at the University of 
California Energy Institute for advice and financial support. I would also like to thank Charles 
Langley (UCAN) for collecting and providing the data used in this paper. 
This paper is available on-line at the Competition Policy Center website:   
http://iber.berkeley.edu/cpc/pubs/Publications.html 
 1 Introduction
A large empirical literature provides evidence that retail gasoline prices respond faster to
cost increases than to cost decreases.1 The California retail gasoline price series displayed
in Figure 1 clearly demonstrates such asymmetric adjustment to wholesale cost. How-
ever, little previous research has attempted to formally model or empirically identify which
characteristics of the retail gasoline market may be responsible for asymmetric price adjust-
ment.2 This paper presents a new model of asymmetric adjustment with predictions that
empirically match observed retail gasoline price behavior better than previously suggested
theories.
Asymmetric price adjustment is not unique to the gasoline market. The phenomenon
has been observed and studied in a variety of industries.3 As Peltzman (2000, p.468) points
out, the prevalence of asymmetric price adjustment suggests ￿a serious gap in a fundamental
area of economic theory.￿ I develop a model of asymmetric adjustment that helps bridge
this gap. Although the model was inspired by the behavior of retail gasoline consumers, it is
general enough to be applied to other industries with similar consumer search characteristics.
If o c u so nap a r t i c u l a rt y p eo fc o n s u m e rs earch behavior that could result in the
asymmetric response of equilibrium retail prices to wholesale cost changes. The model,
which I refer to as the reference price search model, assumes that searching consumers￿
expectations of prices are based on prices observed during previous purchases.4 As a result,
if a consumer observes a price that is low relative to last period￿s price, he perceives that
1Academic research addressing asymmetric adjustment of gasoline prices includes: Borenstein,
Cameron & Gilbert (1997), Bacon (1991), Karrenbrock (1991), Duﬀy-Deno (1996), Johnson (2002), and
Eckert (2002). Existing policy studies include: GAO (1993), DOE/EIA (1999), and Finizza (2002).
2Johnson (2002) ￿nds that diesel prices respond more quickly and less asymmetrically than gasoline prices
to a change in costs. He suggests that this behavior may be consistent with a model of consumer search
similar to the model developed in this paper. Eckert (2002) shows that Edgeworth Cycle equilibria can
produce asymmetric adjustment and presents some empirical support using gasoline prices from Windsor,
Ontario. However, the Edgeworth Cycle theory used by Eckert (2002) and Noel (2002) describes markets
where retail prices frequently cycle up and down independently of wholesale cost. This price behavior is
not observed in my sample or in the gasoline prices of most U.S. cities.
3Peltzman (2000) examines prices in over 200 industries and ￿nds evidence of asymmetric adjustment in
as i g n i ￿cant share of the sample. In addition, Goodwin and Holt (1999) and Goodwin and Harper (2000)
estimate asymmetric adjustment in the U.S. beef and pork industries, and O￿Brien (2000) estimates asym-
metric adjustment in interest bearing deposit accounts.
4The term ￿reference price￿ refers to the external price (last period￿s price) consumers use to compare
with observed prices. The marketing literature uses this term to describe a very similar concept. Appendix B
contains a discussion of how this model ￿ts into the marketing literature.
1Figure 1: California Gasoline Prices 1996-2000.a
aRetail prices are California average prices from the California Energy Commission (minus applicable taxes).
Wholesale prices are weekly averages of the Los Angeles spot market prices from the Dept. of Energy (EIA).
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there is only a small probability that he will ￿nd an even lower price by searching. Therefore,
consumers are less likely to search when price levels are lower than expected. When fewer
consumers search, ￿r m sf a c em o r ei n e l a s t i cr e s i d u a ld e m a nd curves implying less competition
between ￿rms and higher price-cost margins. This illustrates the fundamental relationship
between consumer search activity and pro￿t margins in this model.
The relationship between search and margins is best conveyed by analyzing extreme
cases in which marginal costs are much higher or much lower than consumers￿ expectations
of price. If marginal cost rises well above last period￿s price, ￿rms are forced to charge
higher prices than consumers expect. As a result, all consumers choose to search. When all
consumers search, the model reduces to a full information model of homogeneous product
Bertrand competition in which prices equal marginal cost. Therefore, high search activity
and low margins result when cost rises above price expectations. Alternatively, if marginal
cost falls well below last period￿s price, ￿rms lower their prices just enough to prevent
consumers from searching. Although margins are high, consumers are not searching, so
￿rms are unable to attract more customers by lowering price. Prices fall slowly and margins
2remain high in subsequent periods because ￿rms continue to lower prices only enough to
prevent search each period. During high margin periods, the level of wholesale cost does not
aﬀect equilibrium prices. Firms price strictly to prevent search. As a result, one testable
implication of the model is that equilibrium prices only respond to cost changes when
margins are small.
In this model, asymmetric adjustment occurs because prices respond to cost only
when cost is near or above last period￿s price. This usually happens following large increases
in marginal cost. Price responds immediately in order to remain at or above marginal cost.
When costs fall, margins increase and ￿rms respond by lowering price just enough to prevent
search. This partial response means that equilibrium prices adjust more slowly to negative
cost changes than to positive cost changes.
The reference price search model captures the importance of consumer￿s expecta-
tions by making one crucial assumption which diﬀers from the previous search literature.
Most search models assume that consumers know, a priori, the distribution of equilibrium
prices that ￿rms charge in the market.5 Consumer search decisions are based on this known
distribution. This assumption creates an equilibrium in which both consumers and ￿rms
are acting optimally given the ￿nal price distribution. However, in many applied situations,
consumers are likely to have a diﬃcult time gaining knowledge of the current distribution of
prices. This is particularly likely in markets where cost ￿uctuations produce rapidly chang-
ing price distributions. My model limits the amount of information consumers are assumed
to have.6 Consumers construct a perceived distribution of prices using price information
from previous periods, and make search decisions accordingly. Both ￿rms and consumers
still behave optimally given this reduced information. However, consumers search optimally
from the perceived distribution and ￿rms optimally set prices which may be diﬀerent than
the perceived distribution. The result is that prices respond asymmetrically to cost changes.
The general price theory literature provides very few possible alternative models of
5Examples include Salop & Stiglitz (1977) or Rob (1985).
6Another way to relax the assumption of a known price distribution is to assume that the distribution
is initially unknown and knowledge of the distribution is built up by searching. See for example Roth-
schild (1974). This approach is also unappealing in markets where consumers search relatively few times
before each purchase and price distributions change substantially between purchases. If search is relatively
costly then the prior distribution becomes very important, which mirrors the case described in my model.
3asymmetric adjustment.7 Two possible explanations of asymmetric adjustment have been
raised in the retail gasoline literature, both proposed by Borenstein, Cameron & Gilbert
(1997), henceforth BCG. The most frequently referenced theory identi￿es collusion as a
possible source of asymmetry and temporarily high prices. A consistent ability to collude
in a market produces higher price margins during all periods. However, if the ability to
collude changes along with the marginal cost environment, this could produce asymmetric
adjustment. In the model proposed by BCG (1997), coordination is generally diﬃcult, but
￿rms are able to use past prices as a ￿focal price￿ at which to collude. When wholesale costs
fall, collusion is easier to sustain because ￿rms can coordinate by simply not changing their
price. Decreases in cost provide an opportunity for competing ￿rms to begin colluding. In
contrast, ￿rms would immediately raise prices in response to cost increases, since continuing
to charge past prices would be unpro￿table. Asymmetric adjustment results because collu-
sion delays price reductions but not price increases. If collusion breaks down simultaneously
for all ￿rms in the market, the average price would fall very rapidly to competitive levels.
However, if smaller submarkets are colluding separately, then some prices in the market
may fall before others producing a more gradual decline in the average market price.
BCG (1997) also suggest that consumer search behavior may aﬀect price adjustment.
They point out that the search model developed by Benabou and Gertner (1996) may be
consistent with asymmetric adjustment. In this model increases in the volatility of wholesale
costs lower the value of consumer search. When uncertainty about wholesale cost increases,
it becomes more diﬃcult for consumers to determine if a change in price is unique to a
particular ￿rm or if it is a result of a market wide change in costs. Therefore consumers
search less, and competitive pro￿t levels increase. If higher cost volatility comes in the form
of a cost increase, prices rise due to higher costs and also due to higher margins. For cost
decreases, higher margins counteract the lower costs causing prices to fall less quickly. The
result is asymmetric adjustment: prices tend to rise very fast and fall more slowly after
changes in wholesale cost.
The empirical goal of this paper is to identify whether the predictions of the reference
7In menu cost models, such as Ball and Mankiw (1994), expected in￿ation causes ￿rms to change prices
more quickly in response to increases in cost than to decreases. However, these models do not apply in
many markets, such as gasoline, where short term cost movements dwarf any long run in￿ationary trends.
4price search model and the other previously suggested theories are consistent with observed
pricing behavior. While all suggest a form of asymmetric price adjustment, they diﬀer
in some more speci￿c predictions regarding the dynamic behavior of equilibrium prices.
For example, the reference price search model predicts low pro￿t margins when prices are
rising and high margins while prices are falling. Alternatively, the Benabou and Gertner
search model predicts higher margins while prices are rising and falling than when prices
are stable, since cost higher cost volatility leads to high margins. In the reference price
search model, asymmetric adjustment results from changes in consumer search behavior
that aﬀect all ￿rms equally. Therefore, the model predicts that all stations reduce prices
slowly and concurrently with other stations. High margins in the focal price collusion model
are a result of ￿rm speci￿cc o l l u s i v eb e h a v i o r ,s oi ti sl i k e l yt h a tp r i c e sa ts o m es t a t i o n s
might decrease rapidly and independently of other stations as collusion breaks down. Such
diﬀerences in behavioral predictions allow me to empirically test which model best ￿ts the
data.
Much of the empirical analysis relies on estimating the dynamic relationship between
the retail price and wholesale cost of gasoline in this market. To do so, I model the expected
retail price conditional on past values of price and wholesale cost. Using a panel of gas
station prices, I estimate an adapted autoregressive model that allows the nonlinear and
asymmetric relationships predicted by the theoretical models. With these estimates I can
characterize how prices respond to various types of cost changes under diﬀerent market
conditions. A panel dataset of station prices enables me to estimate market wide responses
as well as station speci￿c responses to cost changes.
Since price and cost are cointegrated, I estimate an error-correction form of the au-
toregressive model using the techniques developed by Engle & Granger (1987) and Stock (1987).
The coeﬃcients are estimated separately for periods of high margins and low margins using
a threshold autoregression. This allows for the diﬀerences in response behavior predicted
in the reference price search model. Following the previous literature, I also separately es-
timate the coeﬃcients of positive and negative lagged changes in price and cost. The four
sets of coeﬃc i e n t sp r o d u c es e p a r a t ee s t i m a t e so ft h er e s p o n s et oap o s i t i v eo rn e g a t i v ec o s t
shock in a low or high margin period. These estimates allow changes in observed response
5behavior to be compared with the predictions of each theory of asymmetric adjustment.
The results indicate that margins are high when prices are falling and low when prices
are rising. Prices respond much more slowly to both positive and negative cost shocks when
pro￿t margins are high. There also appears to be very little variation across ￿rms in response
behavior. While these results are consistent with the predictions of the reference price search
model presented in this paper, they contradict some of the implications of the previously
suggested theories. This indicates that the nature of price expectations and consumer search
may be a very important source of asymmetric adjustment in this market. In addition, the
empirical results identify characteristics of price response behavior that any future theory
of asymmetric adjustment should explain.
These ￿ndings also challenge the existing empirical evidence on the response of retail
gasoline prices to cost changes. Previous studies found that price responded faster to positive
cost changes than negative cost changes. The empirical results of this paper suggest that
margin size may be a much more important determinant of the speed of price response.
By controlling for the size of current margins, I estimate that there is little diﬀerence in
response behavior to a positive and negative cost change. Overall, asymmetric adjustment
still occurs since positive cost shocks tend to lead to low margins and fast response, and
negative cost shocks lead to high margins and slow response.
The next section formalizes the reference price search model. Sections 3 describes
the structure of the gasoline market. The testable implications of the diﬀerent theories
of asymmetric adjustment are identi￿ed and the empirical framework and results of these
tests are presented in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the empirical ￿ndings and Section 7
concludes.
2 Reference Price Search Model
This model derives equilibrium prices for a market in which searching consumers base ex-
pectations of the prices they will ￿nd on past equilibrium prices. Though motivated by
the attempt to explain asymmetric adjustment in retail gasoline markets, its structure is
fairly general. It applies to any market in which searching consumers repeatedly purchase
a product that has signi￿cant price variation over time. To make the proofs more intuitive
6and the notation easier, I assume that the market has only 2 ￿rms. The model can be
generalized to allow for any number of ￿rms. I ￿rst specify a static model of local station
competition and consumer search. Then I create a dynamic model by repeating the static
game and allowing consumer price information to be a function of the equilibrium prices in
previous periods. This captures the intuition that consumers are only aware of prices they
have paid or observed in the past.
2.1 Static Model
Consider a market with 2 identical ￿rms producing a homogeneous good. Both ￿rms have
zero ￿xed costs and a marginal cost c.T h e r ea r eN consumers who each have unit demand
for the good (up to a very high price). Consumers￿ expectations of prices are de￿ned by
a distribution with a continuous c.d.f. of L(p) and p.d.f. of l(p) (which are identical for all
consumers). These expectations are assumed to be exogenously determined in the static
game.8 Consumers do not observe any information about marginal cost.9 Each consumer
randomly observes the price at one of the ￿rms. Then the consumer must choose between
purchasing from that ￿rm or paying a constant search cost k to observe the other ￿rm￿s
price. Search costs are randomly distributed across all consumers with a continuous c.d.f.
of G(k) and strictly positive support. Once a consumer chooses to search, he may purchase
from either ￿rm at no additional cost.
Henceforth, the two ￿rms are called ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2, and the consumers who
originally observed the price at ￿rm 1 are called ￿rm 1￿s consumers. The prices the ￿rms
charge are p1 and p2 respectively. Since the ￿rms are identical and the consumers of each
￿rm are identical, any result about ￿rm 1￿s behavior also holds for ￿rm 2. After observing
8It is common for models to assume that consumers know the distribution of prices being charged in
the market, but not the speci￿c price locations. See for example, Salop & Stiglitz (1977) or Rob (1985).
The only diﬀerence in this model is that consumers may perceive a distribution of prices which is not equal
to the actual distribution. The amount of information that consumers have is lower than what previous
models assume. This is an attempt to more realistically capture the knowledge consumers have about
gasoline prices. In the speci￿cation of the dynamic model these expectations will become a function of past
equilibrium prices.
9In the gasoline market (and many other markets) this assumption is fairly accurate. Consumers generally
have little knowledge of wholesale gas prices. Intermittent news reports often focus on retail prices or oil
prices. Detailed knowledge of oil price movements is probably unusual, and re￿nery conditions cause
wholesale gasoline prices to frequently move independently of oil prices.
7p1, ￿rm 1￿s consumers search if their expected value of ￿nding a p2 below p1 is greater than
the cost of searching. This occurs when:
  p1
0
(p1 − p2)l(p2)dp2 >k
De￿ne S(p) as the fraction of consumers from one station who choose to search, so that:
S(p1)=G
   p1
0
(p1 − p2)l(p2)dp2
 
.
Assume that the distribution of search costs G(k) has a compact support and satis￿es the
monotone hazard rate condition.10 (The compact support is not necessary but leads to a
more intuitive exposition). Because G(k) has a monotone hazard rate, S(p) also satis￿es the
monotone hazard rate condition and has a compact support. As a result, there exists some
price pns below which no consumers search (S(pns)=0 ),a n ds o m ep r i c epas above which
all consumers search (S(pas) = 1). Each consumer has a reservation price above which they
will search, and S(p) can also be thought of as the distribution of these reservation prices.
The hazard rate of S(p) has an important signi￿cance in this model. One can in-
terprete the hazard rate
 
S (p)
1−S(p)
 
as the share of the ￿rm￿s non-searching consumers who
choose to search if the ￿rm raises p slightly. For later convenience I de￿ne φ(p)a st h ei n v e r s e
hazard rate of S(p):
φ(p)=

   
   
1−S(p)
S (p−) : p = pas
1−S(p)
S (p) : pns ≤ p ≤ pas
1−S(p)
S (p+) : p = pns
where
S
 (p
+) = lim
p↓pns S
 (p
ns) and S
 (p
−)=l i m
p↑pas S
 (p
as).
The relative values of c and L(p) (and therefore pns and pas) determine how competi-
tive the market is. Once p is low enough that some of the ￿rm￿s consumers are not searching,
the ￿rm becomes a monopolist over the demand from its non-searching consumers. Now no
other ￿rm can steal these customers by oﬀering a lower price. Since N
2 customers initially
observe each ￿rm￿s price, the ￿rm￿s initial demand from non-searching consumers is simply:
10The monotone hazard rate assumption is that d
dp
 
g(p)
!
1−g(p)
 
≥ 0. This is a common assumption which
insures a unique pro￿t-maximizing solution.
8xns(p)=N
2 [1−S(p)]. Even though consumers have perfectly inelastic demand for the good,
the ￿rm￿s demand from non-searching consumers has elasticity due to the possibility of
search. When the ￿rm raises its price, some of its non-searching customers decide to search.
The ￿rm also sells to all the searching consumers in the market if it has the lowest
price. The total demand for ￿rm 1 is:
x1(p1)=
N
2
 
1 − S(p1)+1(p1 <p 2)[S(p1)+S(p2)]
 
where 1(p1 <p 2) represents an ￿indicator function￿ that equals one if searching consumers
choose ￿rm 1, zero otherwise. The pro￿tf u n c t i o nf o r￿rm 1 is:
π(p1)=
N
2
(p1 − c)
 
1 − S(p1)+1(p1 <p 2)[S(p1)+S(p2)]
 
.
It is necessary to allow for the possibility of mixed strategies. Let Fi(p)r e p r e s e n tt h e
distribution function and fi(p) the density function of ￿rm i￿s mixed strategy, with support
[pi,pi]. Then Firm 1￿s expected pro￿t given Firm 2￿s strategy f2(p)i s :
Π(p1)=
N
2
(p1 − c)
 
(1 − S(p1)) +
  p2
p1
[S(p1)+S(p2)]f2(p2)dp2
 
The expected pro￿t function can be decomposed into a pro￿t function for non-searching
consumers and an expected pro￿t function from searching consumers, Π = Πns + Πs such
that:
Π
ns
1 (p1)=
N
2
(p1 − c)(1 − S(p1)) and Π
s
1(p1)=
N
2
(p1 − c)
  p2
p1
[S(p1)+S(p2)]f2(p2)dp2.
A fundamental principle of the model is that p2 does not aﬀect the pro￿ts ￿rm 1 receives
from its non-searching consumers. No matter how aggressively the competition sets prices,
￿rm 1 can earn positive pro￿ts by setting a price so that some of his consumers don￿t search
(as long as c is not too high).
Lemma 1 Πns(p) is uniquely maximized over the range [pns,p as] at argmaxpΠns(p)=￿ p
such that ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c and maxp Πns(p)=N
2 (￿ p − c)2S (￿ p)=
 
N
2
  (1−S(￿ p))2
S (￿ p) .
Proof: See Appendix A.
This result identi￿es the price, ￿ p, which maximizes a ￿rm￿s pro￿ts from its non-
searching consumers. It is the price which equates the marginal bene￿t of earning higher
9pro￿t margins from non-searching consumers with the marginal cost of causing some of
your non-searching consumers to search by increasing price. The strategy of maximizing
pro￿ts from non-search consumers becomes important as an alternative when competing for
searching consumers becomes too costly.
The existence of a price below which no consumers will choose to search, pns, implies
another simple but important result of the model. If p is low enough that all consumers
purchase from their initial station, no ￿rms have an incentive to lower price further. As a
result, ￿rms will never charge a price below pns.
Lemma 2 Values of p such that p<p ns are strictly dominated.
Proof: See Appendix A.
2.1.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
Given these results, it is now possible to describe the competitive equilibrium. The relative
parameter values of marginal cost (c), the all-search price (pas), and the no-search price
(pns)a ﬀect the nature of the equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium prices are described
conditional on the value of c.
Proposition 1 The following properties of the pure strategy equilibria can be characterized:
1. If c ≥ pas ,a l lc o n s u m e r ss e a r c ha n dp1 = p2 = c is the unique equilibrium.
2. If pns−φ(pns) <c<p as , some consumers search and no pure strategy equilibrium
exists.
3. If c ≤ pns − φ(pns) ,n oc o n s u m e r ss e a r c ha n dp1 = p2 = pns is the unique
equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In cases where a pure strategy equilibrium exists, either all consumers are searching or
no consumers are searching. If c>p as, ￿rms must charge p>p as, and all consumers search.
The outcome is identical to that of a full information, homogeneous product Bertrand model.
If c is low ￿rms have an incentive to charge a low p, but they never charge p<p ns (Lemma 2).
So for low values of c, ￿rms charge p = pns and no consumers search. For intermediate values
of c some but not all consumers search and no pure strategies exist. A ￿rm￿s best response
is almost always to slightly undercut the other ￿rm￿s price in order to steal the searching
10Figure 2: Nash equilibria prices for diﬀerent states of C.
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consumers. However, at prices close to c, ￿rms are be better oﬀ disregarding the searching
consumers and raising price to make pro￿ts from non-searchers. No pure strategy exists
since a ￿rm￿s best response is either to slightly undercut the other ￿rms price or price
well above the other ￿rm. This is similar to the mixed strategy equilibrium found in the
informed/uniformed consumer model of Varian (1980).
The equilibrium prices of the symmetric ￿rms for each level of c are illustrated
in Figure 2. The example depicted represents the case where the distribution of search
costs, G(k), is uniform and beliefs about the distribution of prices, L(p), is normal. The
next section discusses the bounds of the support of the mixed strategy equilibria that are
represented by the shaded portion of the graph.
2.1.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibria
A mixed strategy equilibrium results from c in the range
 
pns − φ(pns),p as
 
.F o rc<p as
any mixed strategy equilibria must have positive expected pro￿ts since the ￿rm can charge
ap r i c ep such that c<p<p as and make positive pro￿ts by selling to non-searching
consumers. Therefore, the expected pro￿ts from a mixed strategy equilibrium must be at
11least as large as the maximum pro￿t ￿rms could make by selling to only non-searching
consumers (which is calculated in Lemma 1).
Lemma 3 For c ∈
 
pns − φ(pns),p as
 
an equilibrium mixed strategy must have expected
pro￿t Π ≥ (￿ p − c)2S (￿ p) where ￿ p is de￿ned by ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c.
Proof: See Appendix A.
I do not fully derive the distribution of the equilibrium mixed strategy, but I describe
the equilibrium expected pro￿t level as well as several properties of the equilibrium support.
Proposition 2 For c in the range
 
pns − φ(pns),p as
 
an equilibrium mixed strategy F(p)
over the support [p,p] has the following properties:
1. p =￿ p such that ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c
2. The expected pro￿ti sΠ∗ =(￿ p − c)2S (￿ p) where ￿ p is de￿ned by ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c.
3. p for ￿rm 1 is de￿ned by
(p
1 − c)
 
1+
  p
p
1
S(p2)f(p2)dp2
 
=(￿ p − c)
2S
 (￿ p)
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 states that ￿rms never charge a price greater than the price that
maximizes pro￿ts from non-searching consumers. They may charge a lower price if there
is some chance that they will attract searching consumers as well. However, they will not
charge prices too close to marginal cost since they can always make a positive pro￿t by selling
to non-searching consumers only. The expected pro￿t from the mixed strategy equilibrium
will be equal to the maximum pro￿ts made by selling strictly to non-searching consumers.
Directly computing the lower bound of the mixed strategy, F(p), de￿n e di nP r o p o -
sition 2 requires one to derive the entire distribution of the mixed strategy. Fortunately, it
is possible to signi￿cantly reduce the region of possible values of p.
Lemma 4 For every c, p satis￿es: p ≥ (p − c)
 
1−S(p)
1+S(p)
 
+ c.
Proof: See Appendix A.
T h es h a d e dr e g i o ni nF i g u r e2r e p r e s e n t st h el a r g e s tp o s s i b l es u p p o r to ft h ee q u i l i b -
rium mixed strategy distribution. It is the interval between p and the lower bound speci￿ed
12in Lemma 4 . The equilibrium strategy depicted in Figure 2 assumes uniformly distributed
consumer search costs and normally distributed consumer priors on prices. A ￿no search￿
price and an ￿all search￿ price only exist when the support of the search cost distribution
compact. Otherwise there is a mixed strategy equilibrium for all values of c. Appendix C
calculates the resulting equilibrium for several diﬀerent parameter values and diﬀerent func-
tional forms of the search cost distribution. The Gamma Distribution provides an example
of a search cost distribution which produces a mixed strategy for all c.
The most important property of this model is that the equilibrium price increases
with marginal cost, c,w h e nc is high relative to consumers expectations of price, but the
equilibrium price does not decrease with c when c is much lower than consumers expec-
tations. This equilibrium property will be responsible for generating asymmetric price
adjustment in the dynamic model developed in the next section.
2.2 Dynamic Model and Asymmetric Adjustment
In the previous section I de￿ned a consumer search model in which expectations about prices
are based on an exogenous distribution. A dynamic model can be created by assuming that
this distribution of beliefs is formed from past information (i.e. past prices). In this model,
past price levels (as well as current marginal costs) directly aﬀect the current competitive
price equilibrium. This section presents this dynamic model and shows how it can produce
asymmetric adjustment of prices to positive and negative marginal cost changes.
The model is motivated by the limited information gasoline consumers have about
the pricing environment. Many consumers are not aware of the wholesale costs of gasoline,
nor can they costlessly observe all the current retail prices in the market. Consumers may
decide whether the price they see at a station is ￿good￿ or ￿bad￿ based on how it compares
to prices they observed last period.
Consider a series of discrete time periods in which the homogeneous product search
model described above is repeated.11 I assume that the mean of the consumers￿ distribution
11Firms are assumed to be myopic in the dynamic game so that they maximize current period pro￿ts as
in the static game. This simplifying assumption eliminates the possibility that ￿rms set prices to in￿uence
consumers￿ expectations (and therefore ￿rm pro￿ts) in the future. This restriction is valid as long as there
are enough ￿rms in the market so that an individual ￿rm cannot signi￿cantly aﬀect the expectations of
consumers. As stated in the previous section, the results of this model apply for any number of ￿rms even
13of beliefs about prices to be the average price charged in the market last period. Consumers
decide whether to search or not by comparing the initial price they observe with their
distribution of beliefs. Most consumers will not search if they observe a price that is low
relative to last period￿s prices, since they believe there is little chance of ￿nding a better
price. Consumers are more likely to search after observing a price which is high relative to
last period￿s prices.
The mean of last period￿s prices is: pt−1 =
(pt−1
1 +pt−1
2 )
2 . Assume a consumer who
observes p1 in period t has a distribution of beliefs about p2 such that
p2 ∼ N(pt−1,σ
2)
where σ is identical in all periods.12 An increase in pt−1 corresponds to an upward shift in
the distribution of the beliefs about p2.S i n c et h ev a l u e spas and pns represent percentiles of
the distribution of the beliefs about p2, they increase one for one as pt−1 increases (as long
as the distribution of search costs is held constant). Therefore, I de￿ne α− = pt−1 − pns as
a constant which holds for all values of pt−1. Similarly I de￿ne α+ = pas − pt−1.
Proposition 3
1. If c<p ns, all else equal it takes at least
pt−1−c
α− − 1 periods before p ≤ c + α−.
2. If c>p as, p responds immediately and completely to p = c.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 implies asymmetric adjustment to changes in c.I f c increases well
above pt−1, all consumers search and price adjusts immediately to c. However, if c falls well
below pt−1, no consumers search, price falls only by α− each period and it may take several
periods before price falls close to c.O n c ep r i c e sa r es i g n i ￿cantly above costs (pt−1 >c+α−),
increases or decreases in cost have no immediate eﬀect on price. Price continues to decrease
by α− each period. The stylized example in Figure 3 shows these three phenomenon.
though it is illustrated with just two.
12This could be viewed as a type of bounded rationality assumption, or alternatively a limited information
assumption. Consumers are assumed to update their expectations of the level of prices, but they do not
update, or do not have the information to update, their expectations about the shape of the distribution of
prices in the market.
14Figure 3: Stylized Example of Asymmetric Price Response to Changes in MC.
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
                         
      
     
    
2.3 Summary of Theoretical Conclusions
Unlike previous search models, the reference price search model incorporates the idea that
consumers￿ expectations of prices are based on equilibrium prices from the previous period.
Lower expectations of price result in a higher perceived value of search for consumers.
When consumer expectations are low relative to actual costs, more consumers search and
pro￿t margins are low. When expectations of price are high relative to actual costs, less
consumers search and prices remain well above the level of marginal cost. These properties
of search behavior result in asymmetric adjustment of prices to changes in marginal cost.
When cost increases well above the price in the previous period, consumers search and prices
immediately respond to the increase in cost. However, when cost falls well below the price
in the previous period, prices fall just enough so that consumers will choose not to search.
As a result, it can take a long time for prices to fully respond to a decrease in marginal cost.
The conclusions of the model are fairly robust to changes in speci￿cation. As pre-
sented, the model assumes that expectations are based on the previous period￿s prices. Very
similar conclusions would result if expectations were based on the level of some weighted
average of prices from several previous periods. A logical alternative to forming expecta-
15tions from past price levels is to base expectations on the recent price trend. For example,
the expected change in price this period might be the price change in the previous period.
In this case, stations have to reduce prices at an increasing rate in order to keep consumers
from searching. Once prices are falling, high margins are dissipated more quickly. However,
prices in this model can ￿overshoot￿ cost spikes since rising prices are expected to keep
rising. Prices still respond immediately to cost increases once consumers begin to search.
An example of equilibrium price response of this model to the hypothetical cost shock in
Figure 3 is illustrated in Appendix D. A more complex model could de￿ne expectations
b a s e do nam i x t u r eo fp a s tp r i c el e v e l sa n dt r e n d s .
All of these speci￿cations predict fairly rapid response once costs rise enough to
encourage search, and slower, gradual response when cost falls well below expected prices.
For the empirical analysis, I have chosen to base consumer expectations on the previous
period￿s price level.
3 The Retail Gasoline Market: Description and Data
Gas stations sell a nearly homogeneous commodity. The marginal cost of a gallon of gaso-
line for all ￿rms is roughly equal to the wholesale market price of gasoline. However the
retail gasoline market is not a perfectly competitive homogeneous market. The travel costs
and imperfect consumer information generate signi￿cant market power. Each station com-
petes in a fairly localized submarket with most of its competition coming from neighboring
stations. In addition, the gasoline sold at the retail stations is not perfectly homogeneous.
Re￿ning companies heavily advertise that the gasoline sold at their stations is superior.
Most companies do add special additives to their gasoline just before it is sold to stations.
Some consumers may be willing to pay more for certain brands of gasoline as a result of
these diﬀerences.
It is fairly hard to observe all of the characteristics which might raise consumers will-
ingness to pay at a particular station. Fortunately most of these ￿quality￿ characteristics,
such as brand, location and station amenities, tend to be fairly constant over time. This
will allow me to more easily control for these diﬀerences in the empirical analysis.
For the purposes of this study, I consider a ￿rm to be a station which maximizes
16pro￿ts with marginal cost equal to the spot market price for gasoline. All types of stations
can eﬀectively be thought of as behaving in this way.13 For an independent (unbranded) sta-
tion the interpretation is straightforward. Station owners buy unbranded gasoline for their
station at the wholesale market price and sellt h eg a s o l i n ea tw h a t e v e rp r i c et h e yc h o o s e .
Alternatively, branded stations sell gasoline under a parent company￿s brand name. Some
branded stations are owned and directly operated by the parent company. The parent com-
p a n yf a c e st h es a m ep r o ￿t maximizing decision for each of these stations as an unbranded
station would. Other branded stations are run by lessee-dealers who operate the station
independently, but are required to buy gasoline from their parent company. The parent
company determines the wholesale price which generally diﬀers across stations within the
brand. In addition, parent companies charge fees, set quantity requirements, and oﬀer vol-
ume discounts for their lessee-dealers which also vary across stations. These parameters
allow the parent company to very eﬀectively extract most of the rents from their franchise
stations. Therefore, the parent company maximizes pro￿ts for the station; eﬀectively de-
termining a retail price by setting the wholesale transfer price and franchise fees. If the
parent company were not able to extract all these rents, double marginalization might be
observed at lessee-dealer stations. However, evidence suggests little diﬀerence between the
pricing behavior of company operated and lessee-dealer stations.14 The lack of observed
double marginalization suggests that all stations price as if pro￿ts were being maximized
by a single ￿rm given the wholesale cost of gasoline. Although a large parent company
might be maximizing pro￿ts for many stations, these stations are generally not located in
the same area. Branded stations experience eﬀectively no competition from other stations
13In most cases ￿jobbers￿ are actually hired to deliver gasoline to the station, but this market is fairly
competitive and the costs should not diﬀer much across stations unless transport costs are signi￿cantly
diﬀerent. Within the single metropolitan area that I study these costs should be similar, but any diﬀerences
will also be controlled for with station speci￿c ￿xed eﬀects.
14Hastings (2001) provides evidence that the organizational structure of a branded station (company
operated vs. lessee-dealer) has no signi￿cant eﬀect on the local market price. In addition, average margins
in my dataset are only slightly higher (1.5 cents) at company operated than at lessee-dealer stations. This
number is fairly small compared to overall margins which average around 16 cents. However, this ￿gure
is subject to the unobserved, systematic process by which a station is established as a company-op or
lessee-dealer. Most importantly, during times when overall margins increased in my sample, margins at
lessee-dealer stations did not increase signi￿cantly more rapidly than at company operated stations as one
might expect if double marginalization was occuring only at lessee-dealer stations. This is even true for
lessee-dealer stations with no nearby competitors (within a mile).
17of the same brand.
Most previous work on asymmetric adjustment examined patterns in city average
retail and wholesale price data. This paper utilizes station-speci￿c retail price data to
better describe observed behavior. Prices from approximately 420 gas stations in the San
Diego area have been collected weekly from January 2000 to December 2001 by the Utility
Consumer Action Network. Los Angeles ￿spot market￿ gasoline prices collected by the
Department of Energy￿s Energy Information Agency are used as wholesale prices. This
series represents the price of generic gasoline on the west coast and is calculated from a
daily survey of major traders. Weekly wholesale prices are calculated as the average spot
price over the week prior to each retail price observation. This is used as marginal cost
because it is essentially the opportunity cost of keeping gas for your station instead of
selling it to other wholesalers.
4 Testable Implications and Empirical Results
The reference price search model as well as the focal price collusion model and the Benabou
& Gertner search model discussed in BCG (1997) all generate asymmetric price adjustment
in slightly diﬀerent ways. As a result, each model has predictions about equilibrium price
behavior that are distinct from the other models. These diﬀerences allow me to empirically
test whether some of these theoretical models are more consistent with actual price response
behavior. I focus on three properties of price response behavior that can be identi￿ed using
the available data and compared to the predictions of the models. The tests address the
following three questions:
1. When are high pro￿t margins observed?
2. How quickly do prices respond to cost changes during periods of high margins?
3. How rapidly do individual station prices decline and do station prices decline in unison
or at diﬀerent times?
Each of the theoretical models have diﬀerent sets of implications regarding these three
questions. Identifying the theory which best ￿ts observed behavior relies on understanding
18the predictions of each model. These predictions are presented and explained below:
Predictions of the Reference Price Search Model
1. Pro￿t margins are larger during periods of decreasing prices.
When prices are falling, consumers do not search and pro￿t margins can be large.
When prices increase, consumers search and competition reduces pro￿tm a r g i n s .
2. Prices do not respond to cost changes during periods of high margins.
When margins are high, all ￿rms lower prices just enough each period to discourage
search.15 Changes in cost should not aﬀe c tp r i c e sa sl o n ga sp r i c er e m a i n sw e l la b o v e
marginal cost.
3. Individual station prices fall gradually and in unison.
Prices fall slowly since ￿rms only reduce price enough to discourage search. Prices
at all ￿rms should fall together and at the same speed since all ￿rms face the same
demand conditions.
Predictions of the Benabou & Gertner Search Model16
1. Pro￿t margins are large during periods of increasing and decreasing prices.
High margins in the Benabou & Gertner search model result when increased cost
volatility lowers the value of search for consumers. Asymmetric adjustment results if
margins increase while costs are rising and falling. Prices will rise faster than costs
because costs and pro￿t margins are increasing simultaneously. Prices will fall slower
than costs because pro￿t margins are increasing while cos t si sf a l l i n g .T h i sc o n t r a s t s
with the reference price search model, whichp r e d i c t sl o w e rm a r g i n sw h i l ec o s t sa r e
rising.
15Predictions of pricing behavior in this model actually depend on the relationship between last period￿s
price, pt−1, and this period￿s wholesale cost, ct. However, I am referring to periods in which (pt−1 − ct)i s
large as periods with high ￿margins￿.
16This general model is speci￿ed in Benabou & Gertner(1993). See BCG(1997) for a description of how
asymmetric price adjustment can result from this model.
192. Prices respond to cost changes during periods of high margins.
Firms in this model are always facing competition from other ￿rms, so changes in
cost will aﬀect the pro￿t maximizing prices of all ￿rms. This does not occur in the
reference price search model since residual demand becomes inelastic below the no
search price.
3. Individual station prices fall gradually and in unison.
Prices fall gradually with cost but are delayed by the temporary increase in margins
due to reduced consumer search. Prices at all ￿rms should fall together and at the
same speed since all ￿rms face the same demand conditions.
Predictions of the Focal Price Collusion Model17
1. Pro￿t margins are large during periods of decreasing prices.
High margins result from collusion in this model. Since it is assumed that collusion is
only possible once costs fall below past levels, high margins should exist when costs
are falling. Margins should be smaller when costs and prices are rising and the market
is competitive.
2. Prices do not respond to cost changes during periods of high margins.
In this model ￿rms collude by not changing price after costs fall. Changes to cost
during periods of collusion and high margins will not aﬀect price unless they cause
collusion to breakdown.
3. Individual station prices fall rapidly and at diﬀerent times than stations in
other submarkets.
Prices will only fall as a result of a breakdown in collusion. If all stations moved
from collusive equilibrium to competitive equilibrium at the same time city average
prices would fall very rapidly. This is clearly not observed in the data. However, if
small submarkets of stations collude separately and break down at diﬀerent times then
17See BCG(1997) for a description of this type of model and how it results in asymmetric adjustment.
20average prices would fall more gradually. In this case, individual station prices should
fall quickly but at diﬀerent times throughout the sample.
Predictions of the three theories of asymmetric adjustment clearly have diﬀerent
predictions about equilibrium price behavior. Table 1 summarizes the predictions of the
three models for each of the three testable implications discussed above. The empirical
work in the rest of this section reveals how observed behavior matches these predictions.
Table 1: Predictions of Theoretical Models for Empirical Tests
Empirical Tests Benabou & Gertner Focal Price Reference Price
Search Model Collusion Model Search Model
When are pro￿t When prices are When prices are When prices are
margins high? rising and falling falling falling
When do prices respond At all times Only when margins Only when margins
to cost changes? are low are low
How and when do stations Gradually and Suddenly and at Gradually and
reduce prices? in unison diﬀerent times in unison
The ￿rst subsection addresses the ￿rst testable implication by presenting summary
statistics which illustrate when high margin periods occur. To address the second implica-
tion, the second subsection models and estimates the response behavior of price to changes
in cost. The estimates are used to determine if response to cost changes are diﬀerent during
periods of high margins. The third subsection uses prices from speci￿c stations to address
the third implication regarding relative response behavior among ￿rms.
4.1 Pro￿t Margins
The ￿rst testable implication refers to the nature of periods with high margins. The Ben-
abou & Gertner model predicts higher pro￿t margins during periods of uncertainty or volatil-
ity in wholesale costs. This means both periods of increasing and decreasing prices and costs
should be correlated with higher margins. In co n t r a s t ,t h ef o c a lp r i c ec o l l u s i o nm o d e la n d
the reference price search model predict low (competitive) pro￿t margins when prices are
rising and high pro￿ts during other periods (since prices are ￿sticky￿ downward).
21Table 2: Average Pro￿t Margins for Periods of Positive and Negative Changes
in Price. (Cents/Gallon)
(N = 95 weeks)
Average
N Pro￿tM a r g i n a
Periods with Large Positiveb 22 4.81
Price Change (2.11)
Periods with Very Little 33 13.37
Price Change (1.97)
Periods with Large Negative 40 29.91
Price Change (2.23)
aStandard errors of means in parenthesis
bPeriods are de￿ned as having a large increase or de-
crease in price if price changed by more than one cent from
the previous period.
Summary statistics help determine when high margins are observed in the data. The
statistics describe the time series of city average prices and wholesale costs. First I identify if
high margins are more frequently observed during periods of increasing or decreasing prices.
Table 2 presents the average margins observed during periods when prices increased , when
prices decreased, and when prices did not change substantially from the previous period.
It is clear that margins are lower than normal in periods when prices are increasing and
higher than normal in periods when prices are decreasing. This behavior is clearly consistent
with the predictions of the reference price search model and the focal price collusion model
where prices can only rise when the market is highly competitive. However, it contradicts
the Benabou & Gertner model which predicts higher margins when prices and costs are
increasing and decreasing than when prices and costs are fairly stable.
I also test to see if direct measures of cost volatility are correlated with high mar-
gins. Volatility is measured by calculating the standard deviation of cost over the preceeding
weeks. Correlations between margins and the three week and ￿ve week standard deviations
of cost are reported in Table 3. The ￿ve week standard deviation of cost has virtually no re-
lationship with margins, and the three week s.d. of cost has a small negative correlation with
margins. Again, these statistics are opposite from the predictions of the Benabou & Gert-
ner model. Together, the summary statistics reveal that the Benabou & Gertner model is
22Table 3: Correlations Between Margins and Measures of Cost Volatility
(N = 95 weeks)
Pro￿t 5-week S.D. 3-week S.D.
Margin of Cost of Cost
Pro￿t Margin 1.000
5-week S.D. of Cost .006 1.000
3-week S.D. of Cost -.187 .674 1.000
inconsistent with the data in regard to the ￿rst testable implication.
4.2 Response to Cost Changes
The second theoretical implication that I test involves the relative response of prices to
marginal costs during periods of high and low margins. In this subsection I empirically
estimate the response behavior of prices to cost changes and compare the results to the
predictions of the theoretical models.
One of the most interesting predictions of the reference price search model is that
equilibrium prices do not respond to changes in cost when pro￿t margins are high. This
contradicts the simple pro￿t maximizing comparative static that higher costs should result
in higher equilibrium prices. Instead, consumers decide not to search if they observe a price
signi￿cantly lower than the previous week. Therefore, equilibrium prices only respond when
cost is high enough so that ￿rms charge a price above the ￿no-search￿ price.
Prices in the focal price collusion model may also act independently from cost during
periods of high pro￿t margins. Firms continue to charge the same price as last period as
long as collusion holds and margins are high. Once collusion breaks down ￿rms have lower
pro￿t margins and react more to changes in cost.
In the Benabou & Gertner model, as well as most other models of competition, prices
respond to cost changes in all periods. Therefore, ￿nding an empirical relationship between
margins and responsiveness to cost would generate strong evidence for the ￿rst two models.
It is helpful to illustrate two interesting patterns that result when prices respond less
to cost changes while margins are high. These suggestions were made in section 2.2, during
the discussion of the reference price model. The ￿r s ti st h a tt h i sb e h a v i o rc a nc a u s ep r i c e s
23to adjust faster to cost increases than decreases. This is simply because cost increases are
more likely to put the ￿rm in a situation of low margins. Conversely, the ￿rm is more likely
to respond slowly after a cost decrease because it is more likely to have higher margins. This
result parallels previous empirical literature on asymmetric adjustment which observes that
prices respond faster to cost increases than decreases. However, the second interesting result
is that ￿rms respond less to cost increases when margins are high than when margins are
low. This behavior has not been well studied because the dynamic models used in previous
empirical studies (e.g. BCG (1997)) did not allow this type of asymmetry. The following
empirical analysis suggests that the level of margins may have a more signi￿cant eﬀect on
response behavior than the direction of the cost change. I now discuss the empirical model
used to test for the presence of these types of equilibrium price behavior.
4.2.1 Empirically Modeling the Dynamic Price-Cost Relationship
The starting point for this analysis is to econometrically model the dynamic processes which
describe the relationship between retail and wholesale gasoline prices. The ultimate goal
is to estimate how current and future prices respond to a change in cost. Therefore, I am
interested in the expectation of price conditional on the current value of cost as well as past
values of price and cost. The best linear predictor of this conditional expectation is simply
the least squares ￿tted value of: 18
pt =
I  
i=0
￿ βict−i +
J  
j=1
￿ γjpt−j +  t. (1)
However, due to linearity, all changes in cost result in an identical change in the prediction
of expected retail price. Theory and past empirical evidence suggest that some type of
non-linear predictor would be more appropriate for this market. My purpose for modeling
the dynamic process is to test how closely the theoretical models predict price behavior.
Therefore, I eventually relax the linearity of the estimation along the dimensions predicted
in the theory.
I work with data from a panel of stations, so the model I estimate includes both
station and time subscripts. Equilibrium prices are likely to diﬀer across stations due
18This assumes that ct is uncorrelated with  t. In that case, instrumental variables estimation can be
used to produce unbiased estimates. I will discuss the possibility of endogeneity in the next section.
24to local market characteristics and station characteristics. To allow for variation across
stations I include station ￿xed eﬀects in the model. These control for diﬀerences in average
price across stations due to locational convenience, brand image or any other diﬀerentiated
characteristics. The model can now be speci￿ed as:
pst =
I  
i=0
￿ βics,t−i +
J  
j=1
￿ γjps,t−j +
S  
s=1
(ηsSTATIONs)+ st. (2)
where:
E( st)=0 a n d Cov( st, ￿ s￿ t)=σs￿ s,t if t = ￿ t
=0i ft  = ￿ t
STATIONs = station ￿xed eﬀects
Note that correlation in the error term across stations within a week has been allowed. This
accounts for unobserved time speci￿c shocks that might aﬀect more than one station.
Dickey-Fuller tests of price and cost cannot reject nonstationarity in my sample.
Furthermore, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller type cointegration test based on Engle and
Granger(1987) suggests that price and cost are cointegrated. As a result, the model in
Equation (2) can not be estimated in its current form, since all the variables are nonstation-
ary. However, Engle and Granger(1987) and Stock(1987) suggest estimation procedures for
cointegrated autoregressions once they are transformed into an error correction form. This
is obtained by simply subtracting ps,t−1 from both sides of Equation (2) to produce: 19
∆pst =
I−1  
i=0
βi∆cs,t−i +
J−1  
j=1
γj∆ps,t−j +( 3 )
θ
 
ps,t−1 −
 
φcs,t−1 +
S  
s=1
(νsSTATIONs)
  
+  st
where:
∆pst = pst − ps,t−1 and ∆cst = cst − cs,t−1
19To illustrate for the case where I=4 and J=3, the coeﬃcients from Equation (3) map into those from
Equation (2) as follows: β0 = ￿ β0, β1 = −(￿ β2 + ￿ β3 + ￿ β4), β2 = −(￿ β3 + ￿ β4), β3 = −￿ β4, γ1 =
−(￿ γ2 +￿ γ3), γ2 = −￿ γ3, θφ =( ￿ γ1 +￿ γ2 +￿ γ3 − 1), θ =(￿ β1 + ￿ β2 + ￿ β3 + ￿ β4 − ￿ β0)
25Notice that the model has not been diﬀerenced. I have simply rearranged terms creating new
coeﬃcient parameters and leaving the error term unchanged. The variables remaining in
levels have been collected into the form of an ￿error correction term￿. This term represents
the tendency for price to revert to its long run relationship. In particular, θ measures the
percentage of per period price reversion to the station speci￿c long run relationship speci￿ed
by: pt = φct +
 S
s=1 (νsSTATIONs).
Estimating a model of conditional expectation (such as in Equation (3)) gives a
prediction of price conditional on cost and past values of price and cost. However, my
analysis is focused on the eﬀect a change in cost has on current and future prices. Therefore,
Iu s et h ec o e ﬃcient estimates to calculate cumulative response functions (CRFs). These
CRFs predict the response path of price to a one unit change in cost. The predicted eﬀect
on price n periods after a cost change is a complex function that includes the direct eﬀect of
the past cost change (βt−n), plus the indirect eﬀects from the resulting price changes in the
previous n − 1p e r i o d s( γj￿s), and the error correction eﬀect.20 These CRFs allow observed
response behavior to be easily compared with that predicted by the theoretical models.
4.2.2 Nonlinearities and Estimation Technique
The linear model above predicts identical responses to all changes in cost. I would like to
test the theoretical implication that price is more responsive to cost changes when pro￿t
margins are low. Therefore, I relax the linearity assumption by allowing the coeﬃcients
to be estimated separately for periods of ￿high￿ and ￿low￿ margins. Response behavior
can then be estimated separately for each regime, and tests can identify if these estimates
signi￿cantly diﬀer. This section discusses estimationt e c h n i q u e sa sw e l la sm e t h o d sf o r
introducing these nonlinearities into the model.
The error correction form is often used when trying to estimate autoregressions with
cointegrated variables. Fortunately, the error correction model also suggests a natural way
to identify ￿high￿ and ￿low￿ margin periods. Since the long run relationship between p and
c is an explicit term in the model, it can be used as a benchmark to determine ￿high￿ and
￿low￿ margin periods. Periods in which pt−1 is above its long run equilibrium level given
20CRFs are calculated by the method speci￿ed in the Appendix of BCG(1997)
26ct−1 a r ed e s i g n a t e da sh i g hm a r g i np e r i o d s . 21
The error correction term of the model in Equation (3) contains levels of pt−1 and
ct−1 which are non-stationary and cointegrated. As a result, Engle and Granger(1987) and
Stock(1987) show that estimates of the parameters in the error correction term are supercon-
sistent and produce misleading standard errors. While superconsistency prevents ordinary
signi￿cance testing, it does provide good point estimates of the cointegrating relationship.
Both studies suggest a simple, commonly used two stage estimation approach that takes
advantage of this by superconsistently estima t i n gt h el o n gr u nr e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e npa n d
c implied in the error correction term as a ￿rst stage. This is simply the OLS estimation of:
ps,t = φcs,t +
S  
s=1
(νsSTATIONs)+ηs,t. (4)
The lagged residual (ηs,t−1) from this regression is then used in place of the error correction
term in the estimation of Equation (3). Due to superconsistency the ￿rst stage residual
can be used as the ￿true￿ value in the second stage and no standard error corrections are
necessary.
The long run relationship is identi￿ed in the ￿rst stage, so the sample can be divided
into high and low margin periods based on the sign of the lagged residual ηs,t−1.S i n c e
the residual from the ￿rst stage is estimated superconsistently, the selection is essentially
b a s e do nak n o w np a r a m e t e ra so p p o s e dt oa ne s t i m a t e do n e .T h i si sk n o w na sat h r e s h o l d
autoregressive model (see Enders and Granger(1998)).
The resulting model is:
∆ps,t =

    
    
I−1  
i=0
β
hm
i ∆cs,t−i +
J−1  
j=1
γ
hm
j ∆ps,t−j + θ
hmηs,t−1 +  t : ηs,t−1 > 0
I−1  
i=0
β
lm
i ∆cs,t−i +
J−1  
j=1
γ
lm
j ∆ps,t−j + θ
lmηs,t−1 +  t : ηs,t−1 < 0
(5)
where ηs,t−1 is the residual from the OLS estimation of Equation (4).
21As a robustness check, I have estimate the model using a wide range of other values to split high and
low margin periods. None of these estimates are qualitatively or statistically diﬀerent from those presented
in the paper. Theoretically, price behavior in the reference price search model depends on the relationship
of pt−1 and ct. Using this relationship to divide the sample also gave very similar results to the method
used in the paper involving pt−1 and ct−1.
27Unfortunately, as Stock(1987) points out, the ￿rst stage estimates from this proce-
dure can be signi￿cantly biased in small samples. This is a result of estimating the long
run relationship while ignoring short run dynamics. Stock(1987) also discusses a one step
estimator which has similar asymptotic properties as the two step estimator and is likely to
be less biased in small samples. This procedure simply involves OLS estimation of the error
correction model (Equation (3)). Parameters of the cointegrating vector are still estimated
superconsistently, but the rest of the parameters (including θ) have correct standard errors
and can be thought of as being estimated independently of the cointegrating parameters.
To test the performance of these two estimators, I simulate results using data con-
structed to be of similar structure and sample size as my observed data. Appendix E
discusses the simulations and presents the results. First stage estimates of the cointegrating
coeﬃcient (φ in Equation (4)) from the two step procedure commonly have a negative bias
of up to 50%. Estimates of this coeﬃcient using a one step estimation are much better, far
out performing the two stage estimates for all sample lengths.
Suspicions of bias also arise when the two step estimator is used on the observed
data. Theory would suggest that the long run equilibrium price relationship (Equation (4))
should have a coeﬃcient on cost that is very near to 1. In this industry the cost of selling
a gallon of gasoline is almost entirely made up of the wholesale price of gasoline, and there
is no way to substitute some other input when costs increase. Previous empirical studies
provide further support, having generally estimated this coeﬃcient close to 1 as well (e.g.
BCG (1997), Borenstein and Shepard (1996), Johnson (2002)). In contrast, the ￿rst stage
of my estimation predicts φ = .48, implying that price adjusts to only 48% of any cost
change. This is most likely a result of negative bias due to the short sample period of just
under two years and the volatility of prices during this period.
To avoid using this estimate of the long run equilibrium, there are several alternatives
to consider. One possibility is to restrict φ = 1 based on theoretical reasoning. The error
correction term would then represent the diﬀerence from the average retail margin (p − c).
Alternatively, I could use the one step estimator proposed by Stock(1987). However, by
estimating in one step I can no longer use the ￿rst stage value of the error correction term to
split the high and low margin periods prior to estimation. The estimates of the cointegrating
28vector are still superconsistent, so I could iteratively estimate using long run coeﬃcients
from the previous estimation to split the sample for the next estimation. Alternatively, I
could split the sample using some other exogenous cutoﬀ. I continue to use the two step
procedure with the restriction that φ = 1. Results from the iterated one step procedure and
t h et w os t e pp r o d u c eu s i n gt h e￿rst stage estimate of φ are not presented here.22 Estimates
of response behavior using these methods are similar in speed of adjustment and level of
asymmetry to those presented below. However, since they estimate φ to be diﬀerent than
one, the response functions tend to approach that estimated value of φ (instead of 1) which
represents the long run relationship of p and c.
The beginning of Section 4.2.1 raised the issue of the possible endogeneity of cost in
the price equation. Fortunately, I have good instruments available for wholesale gasoline
prices. Crude oil prices are obviously highly correlated with gasoline prices. However, oil
prices are largely determined in a worldwide oil market and many diﬀerent products are
produced from crude oil. For these reasons, changes in the price of gasoline in California
are not likely to have much of an eﬀect on world oil prices. Therefore, an oil price series
such as the West Texas Intermediate crude price provides an ideal instrument.
Seven lags of cost and four lags of price are included in the estimation of Equa-
tion (5). These lag lengths are similar to those used in previous studies (1-2 months), and
the estimates are fairly robust to changes in lag length speci￿cation.23 To test for the exo-
geneity of cost in Equation (5), I estimate the model using instrumental variables and OLS.
Robust standard errors are clustered by time period to remove the correlation of errors
across stations within a week. Current and 3 periods of lagged West Texas crude oil prices
changes are used as instruments for the current change in wholesale gasoline price. The ￿rst
stage results of the IV estimation are reported in Appendix F, Table F1. Both a Hausman
test and an augmented regression test are unable to reject the exogeneity of ∆ct above the
36% signi￿cance level. Therefore, my analysis will concentrate on the results of the OLS
estimation.
22The estimate of the cost coeﬃcient in the long run relationship using the one step estimator tends to be
greater than one, φ ≈ 1.5. However, this is identi￿ed by dividing the OLS coeﬃcient of ct−1 (superconsistent)
by the OLS coeﬃcient of pt−1 which implies a fairly large standard error, ≈ .29.
23Additional lags continue to be signi￿cant when included (even for well above 10 lags), however additional
lags sacri￿ce degrees of freedom and appear to have very little eﬀect on the estimates of price response.
29Figure 4: Cumulative Response Functions from Estimation of Equation 5
                                         
                           
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
                                     
                                  
                                 
                                  
                                        
                                       
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
                                     
                                  
                      
                       
The coeﬃcients of Equation (5) are estimated separately for high margin (ηs,t−1 > 0)
and low margin (ηs,t−1 < 0) periods. The behavior estimated by the high margin coeﬃcients
describes the response of p to a change in c given that p is above it￿s long run equilibrium
level. Figure 4a presents the estimated CRFs during high and low margin periods. Recall
that the CRF describes the cumulative proportional response of price in each period follow-
ing a one unit change in cost in period t. The low margin CRF lies above the high margin
CRF indicating that price responds more rapidly to a cost shock during a period of low
margins than during a period of high margins. The CRF equals 1 when the cost change has
been fully passed through to price. The low margin CRF approaches 1 much more quickly
than the high margin CRF. Standard errors for these response functions are estimated us-
ing the delta method. The cumulative diﬀerence between these two response functions is
a l s or e p o r t e di nF i g u r e4 ba n di ss i g n i ￿cant until the sixth week following the shock. The
cumulative diﬀerence at period n i st h es u mo ft h ed i ﬀerences of the two CRFs over the
previous n periods. This represents the total diﬀerence in price paid (cents/gallon) from
what would have been paid if price adjusted at the speed estimated in the other regime.
For example, over the adjustment period a 10 cent increase in wholesale price during a low
margin period would cost a 10 gallon/week consumer $2.30 more than a 10 cent increase
during a high margin period. The CRFs calculated from the IV estimation of Equation (5)
are reported in Appendix F, Figure F1.
30These results are consistent with the prediction of the reference price search model
that prices are more responsive to cost when margins are low. Predictions of the focal
price collusion model are also consistent with the ￿ndings, since collusive prices are high
and unresponsive to cost changes. Benabou & Gertner￿s search model does not predict any
relationship between margins and the response of price to cost.
4.2.3 Re￿nements to the Nonlinear Structure
Previous empirical studies of asymmetric adjustment have directly estimated separate price
response functions for cost increases and decreases. The results generally indicate that
price responds more rapidly to cost increases than cost decreases. However, the model
in Equation (5) does not explicitly allow diﬀerent price response behavior based on the
direction of the cost change. Therefore, this section continues the above analysis while
explicitly allowing for asymmetric response to positive and negative cost changes. This
further relaxes the linearity of the estimation and helps to more accurately compare results
with previous empirical ￿ndings and theoretical predictions.
The estimation of Equation (5) in the previous section assumes that price responds
identically to all cost changes while p is above its long run equilibrium level. The CRF for a
high margin cost change is estimated from both positive and negative cost changes occuring
when price is above its long run equilibrium level. If p responds diﬀerently to positive and
negative cost changes within the high margin regime then the model in Equation (5) is
misspeci￿ed.
To relax this assumption, separate coeﬃcients can be estimated for positive and
negative observations of each lagged cost and price change24:
24∆c
+
s,t−i =m a x ( ∆cs,t−i,0) and ∆c
−
s,t−i =m i n ( ∆cs,t−i,0). Same for price change variables.
31∆pst =

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hmηs,t−1 +  st
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s,t−i)+
J−1  
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j ∆p
+
s,t−j + γ
−,lm
j ∆p
−
s,t−j)+θ
lmηs,t−1 +  st
: ηs,t−1 < 0
(6)
where ηs,t−1 is the residual from the OLS estimation of Equation (4).
Using this model, separate CRFs can be identi￿ed for positive or negative cost
changes occuring during high or low margin periods. Equation (6) is estimated by OLS
in the same manner as Equation (5). The results of these CRFs are reported in Figure 5.
Once again, a Hausman exogeneity test of the current value of cost can not be rejected. Nev-
ertheless, results of the corresponding IV estimation can be seen in Appendix F, Table F2
and Figure F2.
These results continue to suggest that prices respond more quickly in high margin
periods than in low margin periods. The diﬀerence in the estimated speed of response during
high and low margin periods to a positive cost change is even larger than the diﬀerence
estimated in Figure 4 for a generic price change. In addition, the diﬀerence between high
and low margin periods in the response to a negative cost change is only slightly smaller than
the diﬀerence estimated in Figure 4 for a generic price change. This cumulative diﬀerence
in response to a negative cost change is still signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 90%
level after the ￿rst 5 weeks following the cost change. A Wald test of the equivalence of the
models in Equations (5) and (6) can be rejected at the 1% level, suggesting that estimating
response behavior with separate coeﬃcients for positive and negative cost changes is more
accurate. In addition, Equation (6) allows for examination of response asymmetries between
positive or negative changes within either high or low margin periods.
The previous empirical literature on asymmetric gasoline price adjustment has es-
timated more rapid responses functions to increases in cost than to decreases. However,
32Figure 5: Cumulative Response Functions from Estimation of Equation 6
Price Response to Positive and Negative Cost Changes in High and 
Low Margin Periods
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9
Weeks After Wholesale Price Change
Positive Cost Change / Low Margin Period Negative Cost Change / Low Margin Period
Positive Cost Change / High Margin Period Negative Cost Change / High Margin Period
these studies do not separately examine periods with high and low margins. My results
suggest that, in fact, responses to positive cost changes appear faster only because positive
cost changes tend to lead to periods of low margins. After controlling for the size of pro￿t
margins, I ￿nd no evidence that prices respond more quickly to increases in cost than to
decreases. As the results in Figure 5 suggest, responses to positive and negative cost changes
are not signi￿cantly diﬀerent during low margin periods, and during high margin periods
the responses to cost increases are actually slower than the responses to decreases. The
level of pro￿ts being earned in the market seems to be a much stronger determinant of the
speed of price response than the direction of the cost change. Previous empirical studies of
asymmetric adjustment could not identify this result while assuming an identical response
to all cost changes of the same sign.
The result also provides strong evidence for the reference price search model and the
focal price collusion model, since both models predict that prices should be less responsive
to cost changes when margins are high. This is particularly evident in the response to
cost increases. Prices respond relatively quickly to increases in cost when margins are low,
33but respond very little to increases in cost when margins are high. In fact, the estimated
response function to an increase in cost during a high margin period is not signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from zero until at least 7 weeks after the cost change. The Benabou and Gertner
search model does not explain these diﬀerences in price response behavior.
4.3 Station Price Reductions
The reference price search model and the focal price collusion model diﬀer most in their
conclusions about individual ￿rm behavior. Firms in the reference price search model are
all charging their unilaterally pro￿t maximizing price given demand conditions. Since ￿rms
are symmetric they all lower prices to the ￿no search￿ price when costs are well below last
periods price.
Conversely, in the focal price collusion model prices respond asymmetrically because
￿rms collude when costs fall. Firms maintain collusion by charging the previous period￿s
price until a shock causes collusion to break. Average prices would decrease gradually as
long as collusion in a certain number of submarkets brakes down each period. Therefore,
as the average price is declining, a large number of ￿rms charge either very high prices or
very low prices.
These theoretical diﬀerences suggest an empirical test determining whether stations
decrease prices gradually and with roughly the same pattern, or whether they decrease
prices in one particular period and at diﬀerent times from other stations. If sudden price
drops are absent and price patterns of the ￿rms are similar, then focal price collusion can
not easily explain the observed adjustment asymmetries.
I test station behavior by constructing a time series of the maximum and minimum
prices observed in the sample each period. Focal price collusion would predict that the
highest prices in the city would be the ￿rms which are colluding at past prices. The lowest
prices in the city would be ￿rms in locations where collusion has broken and prices are much
more competitive. Therefore, the minimum price in the market should fall more quickly and
adjust much more to changes in price, as they would in a competitive market. Similarly,
the maximum price might adjust much less quickly to changes in cost since it represents
the ￿rms which collude the longest. On the other hand, the reference price search model
34Table 4: Weekly City Min, Mean and Max Price Correlations
(N = 95 weeks)
Correlation Coeﬃcients Mean Price Max Price Min Price Cost
Mean Price a 1.000
Max Price .9782 1.000
Min Price .9946 .9614 1.000
Cost .6324 .5917 .6704 1.000
aMax and Min prices are 98th and 2nd percentile prices respectively
would predict maximum and minimum prices behaving roughly the same as the city average
price since ￿rms are all acting similarly. I use the 2nd percentile and the 98th percentile
prices instead of the minimum and maximum prices to ensure that outliers do not drive the
results.25 Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the ￿min￿ and ￿max￿ prices as well as
the city mean price and wholesale cost.
Correlation coeﬃcients of the minimum, maximum and mean prices for each week
are much more highly correlated with each other than with the wholesale cost. This shows
that even the highest and lowest observed prices are adjusting to cost changes at about the
same speed as the average prices. These results directly contradict the predictions of the
focal price collusion model. The lowest prices are still far from competitive, and the highest
(collusive) prices don￿t respond any less to cost changes than the average prices in the city.
High correlations suggest that all stations in the market respond to cost changes
similarly, as the reference price search model predicts. This can be more carefully examined
by estimating and comparing the response behavior of the mean price and minimum price in
the market. I separately estimate price response in periods when the average pro￿tm a r g i n
is lower or higher than normal. Response of the minimum price to changes in cost should
b es i m i l a ri nl o wa n dh i g hm a r g i np e r i o d ss i n c e this represents the prices from the most
competitive submarkets. In contrast, the mean prices in the market should respond less to
changes in cost during high margin periods because some stations are colluding.26 CRFs are
25Using other percentiles close to zero and one do not substantially change the results in Table 4.
26A similar test of the focal price collusion model would be to directly test if minimum prices adjusted
more symmetrically to price increases and decreases than do mean prices. I have run this test and have
con￿rmed that mean prices adjust more asymmetrically to cost increases and decreases. However, I do not
present these results since the analysis in the previous section identi￿ed that response diﬀerences between
35Figure 6: Minimum and Mean Price Response Function Estimates
                                                                    
              
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
             
                                  
                                                             
                                                                    
                                                               
calculated by estimating the model in Equation (5). However, each of these CRFs must be
estimated from a single time series instead of from a panel. For this reason it is not feasible
to estimate as many lags in the error correction model as are estimated in Section 4.2.2.
Instead I estimate the model with 3 lagged changes in cost and 2 lagged changes in price.
The results are presented in Figure 6. I ￿rst estimate this new speci￿cation on the full panel
of stations. By comparing with the results from Figure 4 it is clear that the abbreviated
speci￿cation produces similar estimates of the CRF as the full speci￿cation.
When constructing the price series of the minimum market price for each week I am
looking for stations which are pricing most competitively relative to their typical pricing
relationship. This means I want stations which are pricing the greatest amount below
their average price. Therefore, I select stations with the lowest de-meaned price as low
price stations.27 The estimated CRFs for the mean price and the minimum price are also
p r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e6 .A si nT a b l e4t h e2 n dp e r centile price is used instead of the minimum
high margin and low margin periods are a more important determinant of overall response asymmetry.
27Here prices are de-meaned from the station￿s average price over all time periods as follows: p
adj
st =
pst − 1
T
 T
t=1
 
pst − 1
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36Figure 7: Cumulative Diﬀerence in Response of Mean and Minimum Prices
                                     
           
    
 
   
 
   
 
             
                                  
                      
              
    
                                    
              
    
 
   
 
   
 
             
                                  
                      
                       
to avoid outliers.
The response functions con￿rm the results of the correlations in Table 4. It appears
that the lowest prices in the market adjust to cost changes at roughly the same speed as the
average station. The diﬀerence between estimated response functions in high and low margin
periods is only slightly smaller for the minimum price than the mean price. Figure 7 shows
t h ec u m u l a t i v ed i ﬀerence in response functions to changes in cost during high margin and
low margin periods. The cumulative diﬀerence for the minimum price series is just on the
borderline of signi￿cance at the 95 percentile. There is little evidence that the lowest prices
are responding as they would in a competitive market, as the focal price collusion model
would imply. Given these ￿ndings, its unlikely that patterns of collusion and punishment
are the main cause of asymmetric adjustment in this market. Stations appear to change
prices in unison as the reference price search model predicts.
5 Discussion of Empirical Results
The empirical evidence in Section 4 suggests that the reference price search model pre-
dicts the type of price adjustments observed in retail gasoline. The two alternative models
discussed in this paper are inconsistent with some of these observed patterns. Table 5
summarizes how the theoretical models match up with the empirical ￿ndings. The three
testable implications identi￿ed in Section 4 are listed along with the corresponding theo-
retical prediction from each model. Theoretical predictions consistent with the empirical
37results are labeled in bold font. Of the theories presented only the reference price search
model predicts all of the empirical results.
Table 5: How the Hypothesized Models Compare with the Empirical Evidence
(Bold font indicates correct theoretical prediction.)
Empirical Tests Benabou & Gertner Focal Price Reference Price
Search Model Collusion Model Search Model
When are pro￿t When prices are When prices are When prices are
margins high? rising and falling falling falling
When do prices respond At all times Only when margins Only when margins
to cost changes? are low are low
How and when do stations Gradually and Suddenly and at Gradually and
reduce prices? in unison diﬀerent times in unison
This empirical evidence does not de￿nitively prove that the behavior described in the
reference price search model is the cause of asymmetric adjustment. However, it identi￿es
price patterns which appear inconsistent with all other existing models of competition and
consumer behavior. The empirical results clarify the necessary predictions of any model
proposed to explain retail gasoline price asymmetries.
Any proposed theory of asymmetric adjustment must predict that equilibrium prices
are unresponsive to cost shocks when pro￿t margins are high. This is not true for ￿rms
that individually maximize pro￿ts over a downward sloping residual demand curve. One
possibility is that ￿rms are colluding and therefore not individually pro￿t maximizing. The
other explanation is that the residual demand curve becomes very inelastic in a very partic-
ular way. This occurs in the reference price search model. The residual demand curve must
become more inelastic below a certain price, and that price must change over time related
to the past pricing environment. This property greatly limits the set of non-collusive models
which could explain the asymmetric pricing behavior in retail gasoline.
The set of collusive models which could explain the observed behavior is also greatly
restricted. There is no evidence in the data of groups of stations sharply decreasing price
relative to the rest of the stations in the city. This suggests an absence of ￿breakdowns￿ in
collusion in submarkets within the city. In fact, all stations seem to change prices in similar
38patterns with no evidence of deviation.28 Therefore, a collusive equilibrium would have to
be coordinated such that the collusive price falls gradually and is independent of changes in
cost. Furthermore, there needs to be some reason why collusion is not possible when prices
are rising.29 It is hard to imagine why such a collusive strategy would arise within this (or
any) market.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the sources of asymmetric price adjustment in the retail gasoline market.
It is one of the ￿rst attempts to carefully model the market behavior that leads to asymmetric
adjustment. I develop a reference price search model of asymmetric adjustment in which
searching consumers base expectations of current prices on prices observed in the previous
period. The model predicts that consumers search less when prices are falling, resulting in
higher pro￿t margins and very little price response to changes in marginal cost.
This is also the ￿rst paper to empirically compare and test the predictions of several
theories of asymmetric adjustment with observed price response behavior. Analysis reveals
that observed behavior is consistent with the predictions of the reference price search model.
In addition, empirical estimates identify price behavior which is inconsistent with previously
suggested theories of asymmetric adjustment. These results indicate that the type of search
behavior described in the reference price search model is a possibly important source of
asymmetric price adjustment in this market.
The reference price search model highlights an important ineﬃciency in this market.
Incorrect consumer expectations can lead to periods in which prices are well above their
full information competitive level. If all consumers were searching and were informed about
the prices in the market, the reduction in equilibrium prices would be much larger than
the sum of consumers￿ search costs. However, given that consumers have limited informa-
tion, all ￿rms charge higher prices and an individual consumer cannot signi￿cantly gain by
28Sharp price drops are also not observed for the city as a whole. So, even if one were to imagine the
whole city maintaining a collusive equilibrium there is no evidence of a ￿breakdown￿ in collusion at this
level.
29Alternatively, collusion might occur when prices are rising, but at a much lower level than after costs
have fallen.
39searching to aquire price information. Data reveal the presence of this ineﬃciency. Even
when retail prices are well above wholesale costs, there is little variation in prices across
stations. Therefore, one consumer would not gain much by choosing to search, even though
￿rms would signi￿cantly lower their prices if all consumers were searching.
Both the theoretical and empirical contributions of this paper should also help further
the understanding of asymmetric price adjustment in other markets as well. While the
reference price search model was motivated by search behavior in the gasoline market, it
is general enough to apply to other markets with similar consumer search characteristics.
More importantly, the empirical tests used to compare predictions of the theoretical models
to observed behavior can also be used to help identify the causes of asymmetric adjustment
in other markets.
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42Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 1 Πns(p) is uniquely maximized over the range [pns,p as] at argmaxpΠns(p)=￿ p
such that ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c and maxp Πns(p)=N
2 (￿ p − c)2S (￿ p)=
 
N
2
  (1−S(￿ p))2
S (￿ p) .
Proof: For p ∈ [pns,p as], ￿ p =a r g m a x pΠns(p)s a t i s ￿es:
dΠns
1
dp1
(￿ p)=
N
2
[−(￿ p − c)S
 (￿ p)+( 1− S(￿ p))] = 0
or more simply: ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c.T h i ss o l u t i o ni su n i q u es i n c ep − φ(p) is a strictly increasing
function (due to the monotone hazard rate assumption), and can only equal c at one value
of p. The corresponding level of pro￿ti s :
max
p Π
ns(p)=
N
2
(￿ p − c)(1 − S(￿ p)) =
N
2
(￿ p − c)
2S
 (￿ p)=
 
N
2
 
(1 − S(￿ p))2
S (￿ p)
. !
Lemma 2 Values of p such that p<p ns are strictly dominated.
Proof: Assume p1 <p ns. Then there exists some p∗ such that p1 <p ∗ ≤ pns and S(p1)=
S(p∗)=0 .I fp2 ≤ pns then S(p2)=0a n dx1(p∗)=x1(p1)=N
2 .I fp2 >p ns ≥ p∗ >p 1,t h e n
x1(p∗)=x1(p1)=N
2 (1 + S(p2)). Therefore, for any value of p2,i tm u s tb et h a tp∗ strictly
dominates p1. !
Proposition 1 The following properties of the pure strategy equilibria can be characterized:
1. If c ≥ pas ,a l lc o n s u m e r ss e a r c ha n dp1 = p2 = c is the unique equilibrium.
2. If pns−φ(pns) <c<p as , some consumers search and no pure strategy equilibrium
exists.
3. If c ≤ pns − φ(pns) ,n oc o n s u m e r ss e a r c ha n dp1 = p2 = pns is the unique
equilibrium.
Proof: Part 1: If c ≥ pas, all consumers search regardless of the price charged by the ￿rms
(given that ￿rms never charge p<c ). Full information Bertrand competition results in
equilibrium prices p1 = p2 = c.
Part 2: Suppose p1 = p2 >c .B y d e ￿nition, S(p) > 0 for any p<p as.S o t h e r e
exists an   such that c<p 1 −   <p 1,w h e r e
Π(p1 −  )=Π
ns(p1 −  )+Π
s(p1 −  ) > Π
ns(p1)+
1
2
Π
s(p1)=Π(p1).
Therefore p1 = p2 is not a best response to p2.
43Suppose p1 <p 2. Then there exists a p∗ such that p1 <p ∗ <p 2. It is immediate that
x1(p∗)=x1(p1) and, therefore, Π1(p∗) < Π(p1). So p1 <p 2 is not a best response to p2.
Suppose p1 = p2 = c.S i n c e p1 <p as there exists some p∗ >p 1 = c such that
Π1(p∗)=Πns
1 (p∗) > Π(p1)=0 .S op1 = c is not a best response to p2 = c.H e n c e ,t h e r ei s
no pure strategy equilibrium for c ∈
 
pns − φ(pns),p as
 
.
Part 3: Given that p2 = pns, S(p2)=0 . I fp1 ≥ pns = p2 ,t h e nΠ1 = Πns
1 .B y
Lemma 2, Firm 1 never charges p1 <p ns.F i r m1c h a r g e sp1 >p ns only if
dΠns
1
dp1
(p
ns) > 0
which occurs when
c>p
ns − φ(p
ns).
Therefore, when c ≤ pns −φ(pns), Firm 1￿s best response to p2 = pns is to charge p1 = p2 =
pns. !
Lemma 3 For c ∈
 
pns − φ(pns),p as
 
an equilibrium mixed strategy must have expected
pro￿t Π ≥ (￿ p − c)2S (￿ p) where ￿ p is de￿ned by ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c.
Proof: Decompose expected pro￿ts into pro￿ts from non-searching and searching consumers:
Π = Πns + Πs. Non-search pro￿ts are simply Πns(p)=N
2 (p − c)(1 − S(p)). Consider
the case when searching consumers never purchase from ￿rm 1. Then ￿rm 1￿s best re-
sponse is ￿ p = argmaxp1(Πns(p1)). As shown in Lemma 1, this must satisfy ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c.
Therefore, a ￿rm with c ∈ (pns − φ(pns),p as)i sa l w a y sa b l et om a k ee x p e c t e dp r o ￿t
Π(￿ p) ≥ Πns(￿ p)=(￿ p − c)2S (￿ p)=
(1−S(￿ p))2
S (￿ p) . !
Proposition 2 For c in the range
 
pns − φ(pns),p as
 
an equilibrium mixed strategy F(p)
over the support [p,p] has the following properties:
1. p =￿ p such that ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c
2. The expected pro￿ti sΠ∗ =(￿ p − c)2S (￿ p) where ￿ p is de￿ned by ￿ p = φ(￿ p)+c.
3. p for ￿rm 1 is de￿ned by
(p
1 − c)
 
1+
  p
p
1
S(p2)f(p2)dp2
 
=(￿ p − c)
2S
 (￿ p)
.
Proof: Part 1: With out loss of generality, assume there is an equilibrium pair of
mixed strategies for the ￿rms such that p1 ≥ p2 > ￿ p.A tp1 = p1 no searching consumers
purchase from ￿rm 1. If p1 ≥ pas this results in Π1(p1) = 0. This is a contradiction to
Lemma 3. If pas > p1 > ￿ p, ￿rm 1 makes some positive pro￿t by selling to it￿s non-searching
consumers. However, Π(p1) < Π(￿ p)s i n c ep1  =￿ p = argmaxΠns(p). Thus, any p>￿ p violates
44Lemma 3 and can not be in the support of an equilibrium mixed strategy. Now assume
there is an equilibrium pair of mixed strategies such that p2 < p1 ≤ ￿ p.F o r p1 ≥ p2 no
searching consumers purchase from ￿rm 1. In this range of p1, Π1(p1)=Πns(p1). For any
p1 < ￿ p, Π1(p1)i sl e s st h a nΠns(￿ p). This violates Lemma 3. Therefore, equilibrium strategies
must satisfy p1 = p2 =￿ p.
Part 2: Since Part 1 concludes that ￿ p is in the support of an equilibrium mixed
strategy, all values of p in the support must have expected pro￿te q u a lt oΠ(￿ p)=( ￿ p −
c)2S (￿ p).
Part 3: In an equilibrium with p
1 = p
2 = p, expected pro￿tf o r￿rm 1 at p1 = p is
Π1(p)=( p − c)
 
1+
  p
p
S(p2)f(p2)dp2
 
.
Part 2 concludes that Π(p)=Π∗. Therefore, p is implicitly de￿ned by:
(p − c)
 
1+
  p
p
S(p2)f(p2)dp2
 
=(￿ p − c)
2S
 (￿ p). !
Lemma 4 For every c, p satis￿es: p ≥ (p − c)
 
1−S(p)
1+S(p)
 
+ c.
Proof: Since S(p) is an increasing function
Π1(p)=( p − c)
 
1+
  p
p
S(p2)f(p2)dp2
 
≤ (p − c)[1 + S(p)].
Since p and p are both in the support of the equilibrium mixed strategy,
Π(p)=( p − c)(1 − S(p)) ≤ (p − c)(1 + S(p)).
Therefore,
p ≥ (p − c)
 
1 − S(p)
1+S(p)
 
+ c. !
Proposition 3
1. If c<p ns, all else equal it takes at least
pt−1−c
α− − 1 periods before p ≤ c + α−.
2. If c>p as, p responds immediately and completely to p = c.
Proof: 1. Lemma 2 concludes that price falls by α− if c ≤ pt−1 − α−. This repeats with p
falling by α− each period until p ≤ c + α−.
2. This follows directly from Proposition 1 and the de￿nition of α+. !
45Appendix B: Reference Prices in the Marketing Literature
In this paper I develop model of consumer search that I refer to as the reference price
search model. I use the term reference price simply to refer to the price consumers expect to
￿nd in the market. This is originally a marketing term which I adopt due to the conceptual
similarities it shares with my model. In marketing literature, a reference price refers to
a contextual benchmark price relative to which actual prices are judged. Typically these
models assume that the diﬀerence between actual and relative prices has some direct eﬀect
on consumer utility. In other words, the utility consumers derive from a good can change
based on their prior expectations of the price of the good.30 This type of concept is not
consistent with classical consumer theory in economics, which assumes that the utility of a
good has no relationship to the price of the good. Nevertheless, there is a sizable theoretical
and empirical marketing literature based on this concept.
Many of the empirical studies have found evidence consistent with the reference price
theory. In particular, it has been estimated that the demand eﬀects of seeing prices above
the reference price are larger than the eﬀects of seeing prices below the reference price.
Studies have also found evidence suggesting that reference prices are often based on past
prices. Kalyanaram & Winer (1995) give a nice overview of the existing empirical literature.
The consumer behavior which motivated the reference price search model developed
in Section 2 is similar to that discussed in the marketing literature. However, the model
does not rely on the reference price entering the consumers utility function. Instead, the
reference price changes consumer behavior by aﬀecting the perceived value of search. This
provides an economically consistent theory of how reference prices can aﬀect equilibrium
￿rm sales and market prices.
30Putler (1992) gives a model describing how reference prices are incorporated into the consumer￿s utility
function
46Appendix C: Simulations of the Equilibrium Price Relationship
Section 2 does not solve for the explicit mixed strategy equilibrium relationship
between price and marginal cost. Therefore, I have simulated the relationship under several
diﬀerent assumptions about the distribution of consumer search costs. The presentation in
the paper describes a distribution of search costs which has ￿nite support and an increasing
hazard rate. The uniform distribution is a simple example of such a distribution. The
endpoints of the uniform distribution result in the existence of an ￿all-search￿ price and a
￿no-search￿ price.
An equilibrium with a continuous distribution of search costs over an unbounded
support has some consumers searching and some consumers not searching for all values of
c. This results in a mixed strategy equilibrium for all values of c.Ih a v eu s e dt h eG a m m a
distribution as an example of a continuous distribution that is bounded below by zero and
has an increasing hazard rate.
Table C plots the bounds of the equilibrium mixed strategy price distributions for
diﬀerent values of marginal cost and a reference price pt−1 = 80. The parameters of the dis-
tributions are designated for each plot. Note that the Gamma distribution has a mean= γ.
I have plotted a lower search cost and higher search cost equilibrium example for both type
of distributions. Clearly a lower distribution of search costs lowers the equilibrium price
relationship closer to the competitive price. Notice, for example, that a marginal cost equal
to last period￿s price (c = pt−1 = 80) would result in a price fairly close to c in the low search
cost case. In the high search cost case the equilibrium price is likely to be less competitive.
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Figure D: Asymmetric price response to changes in MC.
Figure D presents an illustration of how equilibrium prices would respond to changes
in wholesale cost under the assumption that consumer expectations are based on the previ-
ous period￿s price trend (instead of price level). Under this alternate assumption consumers
expect the change in price this week to be equal to the change in price last week. In this
model ￿rms have to lower prices by an increasing amount each period in order to prevent
search. However, prices may end up overshooting costs in the model. Once prices are in-
creasing ￿rms only have to increase prices at a slower rate to prevent search. As depicted in
Figure D, a sudden spike in costs can quickly raise consumers expectations about the price
trend. Once costs fall, prices can rise well above the peak cost level before expectations of
the price trend ￿nally become negative.
48Appendix E: Simulations of One Step and Two Step Estimators
Stock (1987) and Engle & Granger (1987) both present methods for estimating error cor-
rection models with cointegrated variables. In addition to the identical two step procedures
discussed in both papers, Stock (1987) proposes an alternative one step estimator. In sec-
tion 4.2.2 I discuss the possibilities of bias in the estimation of the cointegrating vector of
p and c using these procedures. Stock (1987) points out that estimates of the cointegrating
vector from the one step estimator may have better small sample properties than corre-
sponding estimates from the ￿rst stage of the two step estimator. The simulations in this
appendix test the properties of both estimators on samples which are similar to that used
in this paper.
The panel dataset used in this paper contains 95 weeks of price observations for each
gasoline station. However, since I only observe one cost value each period, the simulations
focus on a time series of prices and costs. I randomly generate arti￿cial data sets which
closely resemble the observed data. A time series of costs are generated as a random walk:
ct = ct−1 + ηt where ηt ∼ N(0,9),
since the weekly changes in cost observed in my sample have a variance of around 9 cents.31
I create a corresponding series of prices by assuming a speci￿c asymmetric error correction
function which has coeﬃcients similar to those observed in my estimation:
∆pt =

    
    
.15∆c
+
t + .05∆c
−
t + .05∆ct−1+
.05∆ct−2 + .05∆ct−3 − .07(pt−1 − ct−1 − 10) +  t
: pt−1 − ct−1 − 10 > 0
.35∆c
+
t + .05∆c
−
t + .05∆ct−1+
.05∆ct−2 + .05∆ct−3 − .14(pt−1 − ct−1 − 10) +  t
: pt−1 − ct−1 − 10 < 0
(7)
Notice that c is assumed to have a coeﬃcient of one in the cointegrating vector pt−1 =
ct−1 − 10. I am interested in the small sample properties of this coeﬃcient estimate.
In the two step estimation procedure, the cointegrating coeﬃcient is the OLS estimate
of φ in the ￿rst stage equation p1 = α+φct+ut. Asymptotically this is a ￿superconsistent￿
estimate of the long run relationship between p and c. However, this estimate ignores the
short run dynamics between p and c which are created by the error correction relationship.
31Id r o pt h e￿rst 25,000 values of the series of costs generated in order to ensure that the initial value
does not aﬀect the simulation.
49These short run dynamics can in￿uence the estimates of the long run relationship when
sample lengths are short.
The one step estimation procedure controls for these short run eﬀects by including
them in the equation to be estimated. The estimate of the cointegrating coeﬃcient using
the one step procedure is the OLS estimate of φ in the following equation:32
∆pt = β
+
0 ∆c
+
t + β
−
0 ∆c
−
t + β1∆ct−1 + β2∆ct−2 + β3∆ct−3 + θ(pt−1 − φct−1 − α)+ut.
This estimate of φ also will be ￿superconsistent￿ due to the cointegration of pt−1 and ct−1.
However, it will be less biased due to the additional terms in the estimation.
I will use the simulated data above to test the small sample properties of these two
estimates of the cointegrating coeﬃcient. Arti￿cial datasets of 100 periods, 300 periods,
and 1000 periods are generated. Then φ is estimated using both the one step and two
step procedures. I will repeat this simulation 1000 times. Table D presents the mean and
standard deviation of the 1000 estimates for each procedure and sample size.
Table E: Summary of Cointegrating Coeﬃcient Estimates from Simulations
(N = 1000 simulations)
One Step Estimator Two Step Estimator
Sample Size 100 300 1000 100 300 1000
Mean .969 .995 .999 .731 .891 .962
Std. Dev. .225 .059 .018 .199 .091 .035
Increasing the sample length from 100 periods to 1000 periods clearly reduces the
variance in the estimates of the cointegrating coeﬃcient in both estimation procedures. For
smaller sample lengths the estimates from the ￿rst stage of the two step estimator have a
fairly large negative bias relative to the true value φ = 1. For a sample length of 100 periods,
it is not uncommon to see coeﬃcient estimates as much as 50% below the true value. In
contrast, the estimates from the one step procedure do not appear to be signi￿cantly biased
even for sample lengths as short as 100 periods.
Since the sample length of the data used in this paper is 95 weeks, these results
suggest that the estimate of the cointegrating vector from the two step procedure should
probably not be used. Although the one step estimate may not systematically biased, it is
estimated with a fairly large variance for samples of this length.
32The coeﬃcient φ is identi￿ed from the OLS estimation as the coeﬃcient of ct−1 divided by the coeﬃcient
of pt−1.
50Appendix F: Additional Results
Table F1: First Stage IV Estimates for Equation 5
Dependant Variable ∆chm
t ∆clm
t
∆oilhm
t 2.461**
(.544)
∆oillm
t 2.578**
(1.063)
∆oilhm
t−1 -.475
(.602)
∆oillm
t−1 1.018
(.972)
∆oilhm
t−2 .416
(.665)
∆oillm
t−2 2.905**
(1.229)
∆oilhm
t−3 .077
(.644)
∆oillm
t−3 1.322
(.903)
P(F-stat)A .0001 .0585
obs 27975 27975
∆oilt represents the change in West Texas Crude Oil Price
Robust-Clustered standard errors are presented
Other exogenous variables not reported
AF-stat is for joint signi￿cance test of instruments listed above
** Denotes signi￿cance at the 5% level, * 10% level
51Table F2: First Stage IV Estimates for Equation 6
Dependant Variable ∆c
+,hm
t ∆c
−,hm
t ∆c
+,lm
t ∆c
−,lm
t
∆oil
+,hm
t 1.299 1.490*
(.799) (.794)
∆oil
+,lm
t 5.031** -.067
(1.839) (1.014)
∆oil
−,hm
t 1.189** 2.438**
(.371) (.602)
∆oil
−,lm
t -.126 2.035**
(.861) (.804)
∆oil
+,hm
t−1 -2.145** -.615
(.588) (.864)
∆oil
+,lm
t−1 .424 .218
(1.077) (.980)
∆oil
−,hm
t−1 .087 -.201
(.307) (.369)
∆oil
−,lm
t−1 -.576 1.166
(1.050) (1.056)
∆oil
+,hm
t−2 -1.513* -1.187
(.873) (1.169)
∆oil
+,lm
t−2 3.709** 2.883**
(1.044) (.781)
∆oil
−,hm
t−2 1.319** .822
(.372) (.514)
∆oil
−,lm
t−2 -1.695 -2.051**
(1.302) (.971)
∆oil
+,hm
t−3 3.242** 2.353**
(.666) (.818)
∆oil
+,lm
t−3 .831 1.142
(1.248) (.670)
∆oil
−,hm
t−3 -.034 -1.245**
(.348) (.503)
∆oil
−,lm
t−3 .354 -1.219
(.825) (.974)
P(F-stat)A .0000 .0000 .0003 .0013
obs 27975 27975 27975 27975
∆oilt represents the change in West Texas Crude Oil Price
Robust-Clustered standard errors are presented
Other exogenous variables not reported
AF-stat is for joint signi￿cance test of instruments listed above
** Denotes signi￿cance at the 5% level, * 10% level
52Figure F1: Impulse Response Functions from IV Estimation of Equation 5
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